Internet auctions for consumers' goods are an increasingly popular selling venue. The Internet's computational ability makes possible the sale of multiple units of the same good in a single auction. Many sellers, instead of offering the entire inventory at a single auction, split it into sequential auctions of smaller lots, to reduce the negative market impact of large lots. We investigate how the available inventory should be split into multiple lots and how many sequential auctions should be run. We also investigate how we can leverage information technology to improve the design of future auctions.
Abstract
Internet auctions for consumers' goods are an increasingly popular selling venue. The Internet's computational ability makes possible the sale of multiple units of the same good in a single auction. Many sellers, instead of offering the entire inventory at a single auction, split it into sequential auctions of smaller lots, to reduce the negative market impact of large lots. We investigate how the available inventory should be split into multiple lots and how many sequential auctions should be run. We also investigate how we can leverage information technology to improve the design of future auctions.
Assuming a truth-revealing ascending auction model, we quantify the effect of auction lot size on the closing price. We then develop a model for allocating inventory across multiple auctions. Solving the dynamic programming formulation, we prove that the lot size drops from period to period. The intensity of the decline increases in the holding costs and the website's traffic intensity, while decreasing in the dispersion of consumers' valuations of the good. Finally, we extend this model to dynamically incorporate the results of previous auctions as feedback into the design of consecutive auctions, updating the lot size and number of auctions. We demonstrate how information signals from previous auctions should be used to update the auctioneer's belief s about
Introduction
Online auctions are one of the more successful uses of the Internet for commerce. For example, online auction pioneer eBay 2 The reason for the growing popularity of online auctions is that the Internet has revolutionized the conduct of auctions in several ways. The computational ability at the auction site for the first time enables the conduct of multi-unit auctions with sophisticated allocation rules based on price, quantity, or time of arrival. The Internet also allows the participation of geographically separated sellers and bidders, who can track progress in real time and search for products at a relatively low cost using software tools such as BidXS.com 6 and AuctionPatrol.com 7 . Using the multimedia capabilities of the Internet, sellers are able to provide rich descriptions of the items being auctioned and therefore are not very limited in the variety of products that can be offered. Online auctions have thus become a viable and active sales channel for many more firms in both business-to-business and business-to-consumer markets.
Furthermore, using computers to conduct the auctions means that all transactions are logged, and detailed information about all bids placed is automatically collected. This information has tremendous value to the auctioneer, since it reveals bidders' valuations for the auctioned goods and can be used in the design of future auction offerings.
The online auction is a fundamentally different way of selling goods and managing inventory than the posted-price mechanism. In the traditional posted-price setting, and in most of the classical work on inventory theory, the seller faces demand uncertainty, but the selling price is fixed. On the other hand, when using multi-unit auctions, the seller expects the entire lot to be sold yet is uncertain about the clearing price. This means that in the auction environment companies can determine the quantity offered, while the market determines the price. The greater the lot size offered, the lower the price received for each unit. We call this phenomenon the market impact of the lot size. As a result of these marked differences, traditional inventory management approaches (Zipkin (2000)), which assume a fixed price and an uncertain quantity of sales, address decisions that are not as relevant to the auction setting.
The market impact of the lot-size decision introduces a set of interesting tradeoffs for the auctioneer. Smaller lot sizes will increase the revenue per unit, but, given an initial inventory, smaller lot sizes will increase the number of auctions necessary to dispose of it. There is a fixed cost to operating an online auction that is largely independent of the lot size offered, and there is a cost to holding items in inventory until they are auctioned off. Increasing the number of auctions and thereby spreading the sale of the inventory over multiple time periods will increase the auctioneer's costs. By incorporating information collected about bidders' valuations into auction design decisio n-making, a firm can manage these tradeoffs more effectively.
The computing power available today makes it quite practical to incorporate auction feedback into decision-making. For example, OnSale.com 8 leverages the reservation price information that it possesses to generate an outstanding response rate to unsolicited emails (Moon (1999)); it creates personalized email offers based on each consumer's willingness to pay. These offers are directed at individuals who participated in various auctions but did not bid high enough to win. Onsale.com uses the highest bids made by these individuals as a proxy for their reservation prices. In general, there are three ways to gather this kind of information. First, if a firm runs its own auctions, it can collect the data directly from bid activity log files. Second, if a third party hosts the auction, a firm can request this information as a participation condition or additional service. Third, when online auctions are open to the public, one can make use of software agents such as AuctionScout. AuctionScout is a data collection and monitoring software agent we have developed for unwrapping the HTML information displayed through the TCP/IP socket of third-party auction houses (see Seidmann and Vakrat (1999a) ).
At all major Internet auction websites, it is common to observe sequential auctions for the same good. In fact, in Vakrat (2000) the results of extensive field data collection of online auctions show that about 85% of the goods auctioned at a popular business-to-consumer auction site were offered repeatedly every day. By conducting sequential auctions for the same product and observing the leading bids file, the auctioneer may learn about customers' valuations for the product. Information collected in earlier auctions can be used to design later auctions.
In this paper we consider a firm seeking to sell off an initial inventory of a product through a series of multi-unit auctions. Before the first auction it has only incomplete information about the statistical distribution of the customers' valuations for the product. The profit-maximizing firm must decide how many units to offer in each auction, and how many auctions to run. To address these decisions we develop a dynamic optimization model using a Bayesian learning framework for analyzing auction data as the Internet auction site collects it. We show how the decisions about the lot size to be offered and the number of remaining auctions follow the optimal policy, and how they are reevaluated after each auction.
The paper proceeds as follows. In § 2 we briefly review some relevant literature and outline the theoretical background, which is necessary to understand the main results of the paper. In § 3 we initially model the multi-unit sequential online auctions, assuming that the bidder valuation distribution is known, using a deterministic dynamic program. We find that the optimal lot size (the number of units offered) in each auction is strongly dependent on the spread (or second moment) of the bidders' valuations and that setting the lot size optimally can have a significant impact on profits. In § 4 we extend our model to include the mechanism we have developed for analyzing auction data to improve future auctions. In this framework each auction provides the auctioneer with feedback that can be used to improve the auction 6 design. We investigate the value of using this feedback in conjunction with the dynamic optimization of the auction design. We conduct an extensive set of numerical experiments and determine under what circumstances this sophisticated approach to auction design yields significant benefits to the auctioneer.
We offer our conclusions in § 5.
Literature review
The Internet has created new opportunities for the use of auctions. As a result, firms face questions that have not yet been addressed by the literature. For broad overviews of how the Internet has changed auctions, see Klein (1997), Turban (1997) , and Pinker, Seidmann, and Vakrat (2001) . In online auctions, the auctioneer decides on the quantities that are put on sale, while market forces determine the auction's closing prices. The quantity offered is a decision variable, while the price is determined by market forces.
In this paper we consider a firm with a given initial inventory that it wishes to sell using online auctions. We therefore look at multi-period profit maximization with an unknown distribution of bidders'
valuations, where the revenue function is derived from an auction setting. In our model, the price is endogenous and depends on the lot size due to its negative market impact. We develop a Bayesian feedback mechanism for learning about the unknown distribution of bidders' valuations.
Much of the inventory management literature assumes an exogenous demand, which is independent of the lot size and of the price. There have been several studies in the area of Bayesian dynamic inventory models with some unknown demand parameter, for example Scarf (1959) , Azoury (1985) , and Lovejoy (1990 The most common single -item auctio n mechanism found on the Internet today is the English auction (see Lucking-Reilly (2000) and Beam and Segev (1998) ). In its traditional form, this is an oral, open, ascending-price auction. Each bidder is free to raise her bid, until there is only one bidder left.
Obviously, this winner must be the one with the highest bid. It is important to observe, however, that the price she pays for the good is the reservation price (the upper limit valuation) of the agent with the second highest value (plus possibly ε, i.e., a tiny increment to go above the second-highest reservation price). This is exactly the intuition behind the well-known revenue equivalence result: in the independent 9 In B2C and C2C online auctions, although some buyers/bidders are resellers, most are individual consumers (Vakrat and Seidmann (2000) ). Under such circums tances, the private value assumption seems reasonable. Realistically, one can think of each product being offered as having both a common and a private value component. For the purposes of this paper we are assuming that the private component dominates.
private value environment as defined by Milgrom and Weber (1982) , the English auction is equivalent to the second-price sealed-bid auction (Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Milgrom (1989) ).
The second-price sealed-bid auction was proposed by Vickrey (1961) , and it is often known as the Vickrey auction. In the Vickrey auction, the highest bidder wins the auction but only pays the second highest bid, and consumers bid without knowing the bids of the other participants. Vickrey (1961) shows that this auction mechanism has the useful property that it is truth-revealing: it is optimal for a bidder to bid her true valuation for the product. If an agent bids higher, she may end up with a loss if she wins. If she bids lower, there is a smaller chance of winning, but the winning price is unaffected--it is determined by the second highest valuation anyway. In general, an agent's strategy is defined as her bid as a function of her private value and prior beliefs about other agents' valuations.
The most common mechanism for online multi-unit auctions is often referred to as the "Yankee In this auction, the uniform price is set by the bid on the k+1 th unit (since there are only k units on sale, it is not a winning bid). The dominant strategy is again to reveal fully one's private information (i.e., one's reservation price). As in the single -unit auction, the Vickrey mechanism is truth-revealing because the winning bidders do not determine the price they pay. At the same time, revealing the true value guarantees a non-negative consumer surplus. Harris and Raviv (1981) show that when bidders have independent private values and are risk-neutral, the expected revenue from the Yankee auction is equivalent to that of the sealed bid (k+1) -price auction. This means that when modeling multi-item auctions we can use the (k+1) -price format to represent situations in which the Yankee mechanism is actually used.
Despite the fact that auctions are prevalent on the web, they have as yet received only scant attention from researchers. Exceptions are works by Bapna, Goes, and Gupta (2000a and 2000b), who develop a discrete model to compare the current online auction practice with an ideal Vickrey mechanism.
They classify online bidders into opportunists, participators, and evaluators and study the impact of the bidding increment. Other aspects of online auctions are addressed by Beam and Segev (1998) , who conducted a field study of some of the early practices in online auction businesses. Segev et al. (2001) use an orbit queue Markov chain to model online auctions and predict the final auction prices. In those cases where their methodology can be proven to provide accurate predictions, one could also use it for auction design.
The e-commerce revolution has made multi-unit auctions for consumer goods more popular than ever, and various sites have gone online recently. Moreover, it is common to find sequences of auctions (typically on a daily basis), each offering multiple units of the same product. As a result, online auctioneers face several complicated design issues that have no satisfactory answers in traditional research on auctions, or in the classical work on logistics and inventory management. This paper focuses on the design of sequential auctions of multiple units of the same good. The next section presents the solution to the deterministic version of that problem, while the following section addresses its stochastic extension with information feedback.
Optimization of multi-unit sequential auctions with a known bidder valuation distribution
Suppose that the auctioneer has a fixed number of units, x 1 , to auction. He can offer the whole lot in one auction, or he can split it into multiple separate sequential auctions. Running a number of sequential auctions has the benefit of obtaining a higher price at each stage because fewer units are offered. On the other hand, each additional auction incurs both fixed costs and per unit costs for the units held in inventory and carried over from period to period. This raises two important design questions:
1. What is the optimal number of auctions that the auctioneer should run in order to maximize his total multi-period profits?
2. Given the optimal number of periods, what is the optimal number of units to offer in each auction?
In this section, we develop a multi-period model of a firm auctioning off an initial inventory of a product in T sequential auctions, each of duration t. In each auction (or period), we make the simplifying assumptions that the number of bidders (or demand) is fixed and that each bidder bids on only one item.
Let i=1,2, …. , T be the index of the period, and k i be the auction lot size in period i. Let ) , (
be the total profit of the best overall policy from the beginning of period i to the end of the planning horizon, if the inventory level entering period i is x i and k i units are chosen to be auctioned off. We denote by ) (
We assume that the initial inventory that the firm wants to auction has been determined according to some decision process. 10 The analysis of the model described here could serve as an input into this higher-level decision-making process. In each period the auctioneer's revenue is determined by the number of units he decides to offer times the auction's closing price. The closing price p(k i ) is determined endogenously by the number of units offered by the auctioneer and the fixed number of bidders n. Revenue in each period therefore is k i p(k i ). We describe exactly how price is determined in the next subsection.
Without loss of generality, the cost of the products sold is normalized to zero, so the consumers' valuations are net of the product cost. Each period has an equal length (i.e., t is constant across periods), and we assume that this, together with the website traffic intensity (λ), determines the number of bidders, with n=λt also identical for each period. We also assume that the minimum allowable bid is 0 and that there is no reservation price.
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Let h be the inventory holding costs incurred by the auctioneer per unit per time. The most popular consumer goods sold via Internet auctions are technology-related products (computers, peripherals, consumer electronics, etc.). These products in particular depreciate quickly and therefore generate substantial holding costs, reducing profit margins. For example, laptop computers tend to depreciate at a rate of up to $5-$7 per day (Vakrat (2000)). Assuming a linear cost function, in each period the auctioneer incurs a holding cost of i xht on the entire stock. Finally, we assume a fixed cost of C to run each auction, which includes, but is not limited to, advertising, website creation and hosting, and auction monitoring.
Combining the revenue and the cost for each period, we can formulate the problem of finding the optima l lot-size policy, for a given number of auctions T, recursively as the following deterministic dynamic program:
integer.
, , :
We place two constraints on the lot size. First, the lot size in each period cannot exceed demand in any single period. This is not restrictive, since if k i > n in some period only n units would be sold anyway. If the excess units were dumped or scrapped in some way, they should not have been included in the initial inventory set aside for auction. The second constraint prevents the lot size from exceeding the current inventory level; the seller cannot auction items he does not possess.
Price determination
Our method for determining the price in a single multi-unit auction is based on a single -period model that was developed in Vakrat and Seidmann (1999b 12 where µ is the distribution mean and s measures the dispersion or the commonly perceived uncertainty with respect to the value of the good being auctioned.
Each bidder is interested in one unit and has a utility function U( i v -p), where p is the price paid by bidder i if she wins the auction. The utility function is increasing in its argument. In addition, the bidders are risk-neutral. The supply of the good being offered at the auction is inelastic, is denoted by k, and is assumed to be less than the number of bidders, n. Let v (1) , …,v (n) be the order statistics defined on the actual reservation prices, where v (1) is the highest bid, v (2) is the next highest bid, and so on. From the analysis above, the bidders with private values v (1) , …,v (k) are the winning bidders of the auction, and they will pay a price equal to v (k+1) . The expected auction price, p a, given n bidders in the auction, can be written as
12 It is not uncommon for even experts to give a range for the value of an object. For example, Christie's (2001) Post-War artists catalog recently listed an estimated value for Andy Warhol's "Grapes" as $30,000-$50,000. Equation (2) follows from standard order statistics results. A detailed derivation appears in Vakrat (2000) . We can see in Equation (2) that the expected auction price p a increases with µ and n and decreases with k. If k > n, the products are sold at the auction's reserve price, which we assume to be µ-s.
We can rewrite the expected auction closing price as
Note that m is a measure of the website's traffic intensity. Higher traffic and correspondingly stronger competitive forces result in a smaller m (0 < m < 1). When the auctioneer offers an additional unit for sale, there is a negative market impact (i.e., a reduction in the closing price) of 2sm. This market impact is inversely related to the bidding traffic. We will henceforth refer to m as the marginal market impact.
Analysis
Given the bounded closing price function in Equation (3) above, the integrality constraint on the lot size, and the fixed demand of n, it is not possible to derive an analytical expression for the optimal lotsize policy. Yet by making some simplifying assumptions it is possible to derive analytical characterizations of how the optimal lot size in each auction depends on the problem's parameters. We later show that these assumptions do not limit the generality of our results.
Assumption 1: The lot size in each auction x i can be non-integer.
Assumption 2: We assume that n> x 1 /T so that there is sufficient demand to sell all the items in inventory. Otherwise, the seller must dump or scrap the excess x 1 -nT units to avoid unnecessary holding costs.
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This assumption is made to enable the derivation of analytical results. We discuss it in more detail later.
We first show that we only need to consider lot sizes greater than zero. Proof: If the firm did not auction the entire remaining inventory at the start of period T it would mean that it is optimal for the firm to "dump" some of its inventory. If this were the case it would have been preferable to dump it before the first auction and avoid the holding costs of carrying it through to period T. ¦ .
The following proposition defines the optimal profit of the auctioneer. 
and the auctioneer's resulting profit from period 1 to period T is given by
Proof:
We first consider an approximation to the optimization problem in which the expected price received is µ + s -2sm(k i +1) even when k i exceeds n and more than n units can be sold in each auction.
For the approximate problem we can use Lemmas 1 and 2 and backward induction (see Appendix for details) to show that, in any period i, 
Before making some observations about the results of Proposition 1 we discuss the implications of Assumptions 1-3. Assumption 1 introduces some rounding-off error into our solution but does not change the qualitative nature of the results. Assumption 2 is not very restrictive and serves only to avoid the consideration of cases in which the firm would be forced to dump or scrap units. This would be a concern if demand were stochastic, but with deterministic demand the firm would dump or scrap the excess x 1 -nT units to avoid holding costs, suggesting that x 1 was set too high. Since we have assumed x 1 is determined exogenously, we ignore these situations by only considering T sufficiently large that nT≥x 1 .
Assumption 3 enables us to derive the analytical characterization of the optimal lot size in each period.
Assumption 3 states a condition involving most of the parameters of the problem, and when this condition is violated a situation exists (e.g., holding costs are very high) in which it is in the interest of the seller to initially "dump" large quantities of the product at a price below his reservation price to reduce inventory.
As inventory decreases the condition will eventually be satisfied in all future auctions, and then the results of Proposition 1 will hold. When the condition in Assumption 3 is violated it is impossible to derive closed-form analytical results, but we find in our numerical experiments that the model's behavior is the same as when the condition holds. We therefore believe that the observations we make about the model's behavior based on Proposition 1 and Assumptions 1-3 will hold in general.
Given an optimal number of periods, T * (obtained by maximizing Equation (5)), we can analyze the form of the optimal lot size in each period. The first term of Equation (4) We observe that higher inventory costs (h) result in a stronger correction; more units are moved toward early periods. Recall that 0 < m < 1 and that a lower m implies higher traffic into the web auction site. Also, according to our price determination model, higher traffic means more competition and consequently a higher closing price. Higher traffic thus results in an optimal lot-size policy that assigns more weight to early auctions. With a higher traffic rate, more units can be offered in each auction without significantly affecting the price. More units can be shifted to early periods in order to save on the total inventory costs.
Once the number of auctions T is selected, the optimal lot size is independent of µ but dependent on s. Proposition 1 also shows that higher dispersion in consumers' valuations results in fewer units shifted toward early periods. A market with a higher level of consumer ignorance is typically characterized by a higher dispersion of va lues. Greater dispersion creates an opportunity for the auctioneer to obtain higher closing prices on average, because if he is able to attract enough bidders, there is a higher probability that the auctioneer will encounter (ignorant) bidders with high valuations. As a result, high dispersion creates stronger incentives to balance the lot size across periods, since deviating from the single -period optimum means greater loss of revenue. At the same time, large lot sizes increase the risk of the price being determined by a low bid. This is a further incentive for the auctioneer to balance the lot size when the dispersion is high.
In Table 1 we present the results of a numerical experiment in which we demonstrate the importance of performing optimal lot siz ing. In Column 6 of the table we show the cumulative profits of the auctions when the auctioneer uses a naïve par lot-sizing policy in which the initial inventory is evenly distributed among all the auctions conducted. In Column 7 we show the cumulative profit of the auctions when the auctioneer uses an optimal lot-size strategy. Coincidentally, in both cases the optimal number of sequential auctions is the same, five. The parameter values used in these experiments were the following: µ = $100, s = $50, C = $100, h = $20, n = 10, t = 1. From Table 1 we see that profit is significantly higher when the optimal lot-sizing policy is used; it results in a 37% improvement. It is interesting to note that this improvement only becomes apparent after all the auctions have been conducted. We also see in Column 5 that the lot size decreases from auction to auction. Optimally selecting the number of auctions to conduct is also of significance to the auctioneer's profit. In Figure 1 we plot the par policy and optimal lot-size policy profits for different numbers of auctions using the same data set as in Table 1 . In that case the optimal number of auctions was five, for both the par and the optimal policies studied. Figure 1 illustrates that running too many or too few auctions can reduce profits significantly even when the lot sizes are determined optimally.
Auction duration
A third auction design parameter of importance is the duration of each individual auction.
Increasing the length of an auction increases the amount of time one must hold inventory and therefore will increase costs. At the same time, increasing the duration will attract more bidders, thereby increasing the price received per unit sold and the revenue. Looking at Equation (4) in Proposition 1, we can see that increasing t, the number of days the auction runs, will increase the lot size in each auction. Given a fixed initial inventory, this will decrease the number of auctions conducted. In Figure 2 we plot the We can see the main tradeoffs at work in Figure 2 . When auctions are short, the seller must have more of them because the bid traffic in any one auction is small. Many auctions mean that the firm incurs the fixed cost of running an auction many times for a given starting inventory, so profits are low. As the duration of the auction increases, profits do as well, but if auctions are too long holding costs become excessive and profits start to decrease. We also see that the profit function is steeper for short durations than for longer durations. This is a reflection of the relative magnitude of holding and fixed costs. For our example it suggests that it is better to err on the side of making an auction too long rather than too short.
Multiple sequential auctions with information feedback
When designing an online auction, the auctioneer faces an optimization problem that involves multiple design parameters. In the previous section we have shown how to select some of these parameters optimally, but solving the model involves estimating others, which necessarily entails errors.
One of the advantages of online auctions is that it is easy to collect information about bidders' behavior
Profit ($)
for the purpose of analysis. This information gives the seller feedback on the accuracy of his understanding of the market. We investigate how the auctioneer can use observations of the bidders' reservation prices as feedback on his estimate of the dispersion of customers' valuations. We show that this new information can change the design of later auctions in the series.
We focus on learning the dispersion of consumers' valuations for the following reasons:
1.
Proposition 1 demonstrates the importance of the dispersion of consumers' valuations in determining the optimal lot-size policy.
2.
The dispersion of consumers' valuations significantly influences the seller's price risk.
High dispersion, low website traffic, and large lot sizes all increase the probability that the auction price will be determined by bidders drawn from the left tail of the valuation distribution (Vakrat and Seidmann 1999a).
3.
We expect that the auctioneer would have a good sense for the mean of consumers'
valuations, while the dispersion would be more difficult to estimate. Most items that are offered via
Internet auctions can be typically related to publicly available prices (e.g., alternative posted-price channels), so the seller should be able to form a reasonable estimate of the mean. Selling items via a posted-price mechanism, however, does not provide the seller with explicit reservation pr ice information and therefore does not guide him with respect to the dispersion of consumers' valuations.
In what follows we present a structured information-gathering method, built on Bayesian learning techniques, in which the auctioneer has a prior estimate of the dispersion of consumers' reservation values (denoted by s in the previous section). Running the auction and monitoring the bidding activity provides the auctioneer a signal of the actual dispersion. This observation of the dispersion has its own distribution. The auctioneer then updates his belief and forms a posterior that will help him design the next period's auction better. We next describe the Bayesian updating method used here and the key assumptions. (since consumers' valuations (v j 's) must be nonnegative). We assume that the auctioneer observes all bidders' reservation prices and uses this information to update his estimation of s, or of a and b.
Learning the dispersion of consumers' valuations
In practice, there is considerably more information available to the online auctioneer about reservation prices than theory predicts. In the traditional (offline) English auction setting the auctioneer cannot observe all the bidders' reservation pric es. Rather, the auctioneer observes the highest bid needed to win, which is in theory a small increment above the k+1 st highest reservation price in an auction with k items. The true reservation price of the winners may be much higher than the winning bid. In the traditional (offline) auction, the auctioneer's observations are censored, and the estimation problem therefore becomes more complex. The computerization of auctions has made it easier to collect the reservation price data as discussed in section 1 above. For example, by analyzing the bid history the auctioneer can identify the bid at which each individual participant dropped out of the competition, and then, by adding one increment (one tick), the auctioneer gets a very good proxy for the reservation price of these individuals. In addition, the use of bidding agents in an online auction could also provide the auction house with reservation values directly. 13 Each time the online auctioneer runs an auction, he observes a random draw of the population's reservation prices (v j 's). Let Y i be the observed maximum distance from the mean:
As mentioned above, in the first period the auctioneer's prior on s is The observed signal (the maximal deviation from the mean) from the first auction is denoted by y 1 .
We can now use Bayes' formula to calculate the auctioneer's posterior on s for the second period: Knowing the posterior distribution, the auctioneer can calculate his updated estimate for the dispersion of consumers' valuations. We can see from Proposition 2 that the distribution of s is completely specified by l i and i because the number of bids in each period is known to be n. Period i tells us how many bids have been observed so far, and l i gives us the lower bound on s.
We can incorporate the learning method described above into the optimization problem that was analyzed in § 3. The analysis above naturally implies an additional state variable , which is the lower bound on s (namely l i ). The auction design dynamic program therefore is now redefined in a twodimensional state space, is now stochastic, and can be formulated as follows: (12) where the distribution of s is determined by l i and the number of auctions run so far. The solution to the entire planning problem is given by ( ).
In practice, we expect the problem to be solved in the following manner using a myopic approach:
Step 1: The auctioneer begins with a prior distribution on s (e.g., uniform on [a,b]).
Step 2: The auctioneer then solves the lot-sizing problem--i.e., determines the number of auctions and their lot sizes--in a way that maximizes the expected profit over all possible values of s.
Step 3: After conducting a single auction using the results of Step 2, the auctioneer revises the distribution of s.
Step 4: If there is inventory remaining, the auctioneer repeats Step 2 with the revised distribution on s from Step 3; otherwise he stops.
This approach is myopic in the sense that the lot-sizing decisions are made under the assumption that the distribution of s will not change in the future. Numerical experimentation has shown that there is little difference between the outcomes of the myopic and non-myopic implementations of this methodology. Mathematically, in each period i, given an inventory of x i and an observed spread of l i , the auctioneer solves the following problem:
Numerical experiments
To illustrate the potential of using auction feedback in sequential auctions, we conduct a set of illustrative numerical experiments. We assume that the spread of customers' valuations (s) is unknown with a uniform distribution [a,b] . We then compare three approaches to the auction design:
• Full information
• Par policy
• Auction feedback
In the full information scenario we assume that the actual value of s (a ≤ s ≤ b) is known when the auction is designed. The full information scenario therefore serves as an upper bound on the profit the auctioneer can receive. In the par policy we assume that the auctioneer distributes the initial inventory equally across all the sequential auctions and the number of auctions run is selected so that the expected profit is maximized over all possible values of s. In the auction feedback scenario we use the computation algorithm described in § 4.1 and update the distribution of s each period based on the bids observed thus far. The lot sizes are determined dynamically to maximize the expected value of Equation (12) . To make comparisons between the three approaches we need to compute the expected performance of the myopic auction feedback strategy. To do this we must perform the backward recursion calculations to solve Equatio n (12), but in each period instead of selecting the true profit-maximizing lot size we choose the lot size that solves Equation (13) . This procedure is computationally intensive as compared with simply implementing the myopic strategy and fortunately is only necessary for the kind of comparisons we perform here and not for application in practice. For these experiments we use the following set of parameter values: µ = $100, C = $100, h = $14, n = 10, t = 1.
In Figure 3 we plot the fraction of the full information auctioneer profit as a function of the number of bidders per auction n for each of the three design approach. We observe a number of important effects.
First, for lower bid traffic the auction feedback approach significantly outperforms the par policy approach. Second, as the number of bidders increases, the gap between the auction feedback approach and the full information approach narrows. This happens because learning occurs faster with more bidders per auction. Finally, as the number of bidders increases further, the performance of the par policy and auction feedback approaches asymptotically converges to the full information profits from below.
This convergence occurs because if the traffic (or demand) in each auction is sufficiently high, then it makes sense to run only a few auctions and there are no longer noticeable differences in the lot sizes used in each approach. As n increases, the intense competition among the bidders results in market depth that makes prices less sensitive to the size of the lot being offered. In Figure 4 we plot the fraction of the full information auctioneer profit as a function of the holding costs for each of the design approaches. We see that the benefit of the auction feedback mechanism relative to the par policy approach, increases with the holding costs. This makes sense, since higher holding costs increase the sensitivity of the total cost function to the auction lot-size policies. Hence, the use of auction feedback data is expected to be more valuable when dealing with expensive items or with items that depreciate rapidly over time. In the next two figures we investigate how uncertainty in the parameter s affects the benefits of using auction feedback. In Figure 5 we fix the mean of our prior uniform distribution of s at 50 and consider different upper and lower bounds on s so that the coefficient of variation varies. We plot the fraction of the full information profit achieved as a function of the coefficient of variation. As the coefficient of variation increases, the gap between the auction feedback and par policy approaches increases. At the same time, the auction feedback approach performs worse relative to the full information case, because there is more to learn. For instance when the coefficient of variation of s is .2 the auction feedback profits are 98% of the full information, dropping to 90% of the full information profits when the coefficient of variation of s increases to .5. Yet we also observe that the auction feedback approach leads to performance improvements between 25% and 50% over the par policy. The greater the uncertainty in the parameter, the more valuable the feedback procedure is to the auctioneer. In Figure 6 we plot similar results as in Figure 5 , but with s having a smaller mean (E[s]=25), in order to study the impact of a narrower spread of the customers' valuations. We see a similar response to changes in the coefficient of variation, as in Figure 5 , but both the auction feedback and par policy approaches perform much better. We observe that because of the improved performance of the par policy, the relative benefit of using auction feedback decreases with E[s]. When we assumed that the valuation spread parameter was known we found that the optimal lot sizes decreased with each auction. This was demonstrated with a numerical example in Table 1 . When the auction feedback mechanism is used this is not necessarily the case. In Table 2 we display a sample path of the solution of the auction lot-sizing problem with feedback using the same parameters as in the results displayed in Figures 3-6 . For each period we list the starting inventory, the largest observed spread thus far, the optimal number of auctions to run given the current distribution of s, the optimal lot size, and the expected value of s given the observed bids. Table 2 : An example of a sample path of the optimal lot size k i and the optimal number of auctions T i when using auction feedback.
Fraction of Full-info Profit
We observe (in Column 5) that the optimal number of auctions dynamically changes. Initially (before the start of auction 1), a total of five auctions are planned, but after two auctions are observed, the optimal total number of auctions is revised down to four (i.e. before the start of auction three, it is optimal to conduct two more auctions). We also observe (in Column 6) that the optimal lot size increases after the first auction and then decreases. It increases because after the first auction the expected value of the valuation spread, s, is revised downward from 50.50 to 21.37. A smaller spread reduces the risk of low prices and therefore makes a larger lot size more attractive. In Column 7, we see how the auctioneer's belief about the expected value of s is converging with more observations. For example, after observing a maximum valuation spread of $25 in three successive auctions (30 observations), the probability of seeing a spread of more than $26 can be calculated using Equation (11) and shown to be less than 10%.
We can summarize the results of our experiments with the Bayesian learning methodology as follows:
• Using auction feedback provides increasing benefits when auction traffic is smaller.
• The auction feedback scenario performs asymptotically like the perfect information scenario as holding costs decrease.
• Auction feedback provides increasing benefits relative to a non-Bayesian policy with an increase in holding costs.
• The benefits of auction feedback tend to increase with larger spreads of the bidders'
valuations.
• Auction feedback can lead to lot sizing polices that are very different from those developed when the valuation spread parameter is assumed to be fixed.
Conclusions
When conducting online auctions a firm must determine the lot size for each auction, the number of auctions to run, and the duration of each auction. To address these important issues we develop a multiperiod dynamic optimization model of the multi-unit auction design problem. Our results demonstrate that, when auctioning multiple units of the same product, optimizing lot sizes, the number of auctions, and the duration of the individual auctions can improve firm profits significantly. We also find that when the distribution of the bidders' valuations is known, the optimal lot size is monotonically non-increasing across sequential auctions. Another interesting observation is the sensitivity of the total profit to the total number of auctions regardless of whether the lot sizes are chosen optimally or are identical. Having too few auctions leads to a larger lot size per auction, with a negative impact on the closing price. On the other hand, splitting the initial inventory across too many auctions results in excessive holding and administrative costs.
The highest bidders determine auction prices, and these bidders form the right tail of the valuation distribution among the population of potential buyers. This explains why having the correct estimate for the dispersion of bidders' valuations is important in determining the optimal auction design. Online auctions offer an effective mechanism for collecting data about the actual valuations of bidders that can be used to estimate the dispersion in customers' valuations. To exploit this information, we extend our model to include a Bayesian framework for incorporating the results of previous auctions as feedback into design decisions for consecutive auctions of the same item. Numerical experimentation shows that incorporating Bayesian analysis into the multi-period, multi-item optimization model results in substantial benefits to the seller, primarily when the auction traffic is relatively small, holding costs are high, and there is a relatively large spread in bidders' valuations. Using the bidding information from previous auctions leads to dynamic adjustments in both the optimal number of remaining auctions and the optimal lot size. Given the significant benefit and the ease of use of this approach, we expect that it will be adopted by businesses that make significant use of online auctions.
There are several interesting avenues for future research in this area. We have not included the minimum bid or reservation price as endogenous design parameters despite the fact that it may influence bidders' participation. We have also assumed that the initial inventory is exogenously determined, and it may be interesting to extend our model to include production decisions as well as lot-sizing decisions.
Another important question involves finding ways that auctioneers can increase the arrival rates of bidders through advertising and price promotions. Internet technologies allow for innovations in business practices that are unprecedented in their scope and scale, and many exciting research challenges remain in the area of the optimal design of online auctions, on both the empirical and the theoretical frontier. ( ) ( 
The profit functions we have derived for periods T-1 and T-2 are of this form as well.
In period i-1 the profit, then, is ( 
